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JPRS L/8734 26 October 1979

## Japan Report

(FOUO 31/79)



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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JPRS L/8734

26 October 1979

# JAPAN REPORT (FOUO 31/79)

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

'ASAHI' VIEWS RESULTS OF DIET ELECTIONS

Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 11 Oct 79 p 2 OW

[ASAHI SHIMBUN 9 October editorial: "Voters Rejected LDP"]

[Excerpts] The attempt by Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira to establish a stable majority for the Liberal Democratic Party in the house of representatives failed because of sound judgment made by the voters. In the general election on 7 October, the people had a choice between continuing the government—opposition near parity prevailing in both houses of the Diet for the past several years and returning to single—party control by the LDP. They clearly opted for parity.

The hopes that individual voters placed in their ballots are diverse. There was a strong demand on the part of the people that Ohira and the LDP conduct self-examination in connection with their political stand and policies. At the same time, the voters made stronger demands for responsible political conduct by the opposition parties now that they have increased their strength.

Ohira's Responsibility

We analyze the results of the election, which decided who would govern us in the 1980's, as follows:

The judgment of the people was very severe. Because public opinion polls only a few days before the election day almost all predicted "recovery by the LDP" and "victory for the LDP," the harshness of the verdict may appear to be more dramatic than it really is. But when we contemplate the matter, the results are neither dramatic nor unexpected.

We would like to believe that the people, who had been thinking about what government in Japan should be like, handed down a very reasonable and sound judgment.

Without trying to correct the structural scandals and corruption and deterioration in political morals attendant on political control for many years by one party, the Ohira cabinet carried out the dissolution

of the lower house and the general election, which reflected strong factional interests.

During the campaign period, irregular accounting practices and wasteful spending of tax money by the Japan Railway Construction Corporation and various government ministries and agencies were exposed. Although the general excise tax and other tax problems became the focal point in the general election, no substantial efforts aimed at administrative reform and political cleanup, which are prior conditions for increasing taxes, had been made. Therefore, the election results are not surprising.

The LDP probably carried out the election in the belief that it could win and that if it won, it would be easy to govern afterward. If it had won as expected, those grappling seriously with government would lose out. Under such a political situation, even if outstanding policies are listed, the basis for implementing them would be corrupted and the foundation for democratic government would be demolished.

The national consensus, which has humbled an arrogant party, showed the sound judgment and the balanced sense of the people. However, the voters must engage in self-reflection over the fact that the voting rate was the second lowest in the postwar period. Also there may have been voters who were swayed by immediate, personal interests or by a sense of duty toward friends. Still, the election results can be termed a well thought-out assessment.

Government-Opposition Parity Inevitable

The election was not one that the people had wished for or one that the political situation had warranted. This election was forced on the people by Ohira and his aides in spite of the fact that the issues were unclear. For this reason, Ohira is all the more responsible for its results. First of all the prime minister should ponder the meaning of the failure in his attempt. Voices are already rising from within the LDP pressing hard the premier's accountability for the setback. This is natural and more must be done.

However, such intraparty debates should not lead to the distribution of power among factions over post-election cabinet and party appointments. The LDP should have learned a lesson from the election that only through the use of party energy could it reform its corrupt constitution and improve government.

This also means the recognition of the present situation—that the government and the opposition are at a par with each other in the Diet—something inevitable and the assumption of a political posture that is in keeping with such an awareness. The same problem which Japan must solve faces many advanced countries. The parliamentary parity and multiparty government reflecting the interests of various classes of people are common in these countries. Japan should look straight at such a reality.

Heavier Responsibility For Opposition

The choice of the people to see a continuation of politics in which the government and the opposition are at a par with each other places still heavier responsibilities on the parties in the opposition camp. Among these parties the Japan Socialist Party is the one whose ability to carry its new burdens will be questioned the most.

Undoubtedly, the JSP has been unable to stop its decline, the new political map shows a tendency on the part of the voters to shun the LDP and the JSP. If the JSP fails to seriously consider why this is happening, it could collapse in the not-too-distant future.

In this respect, we would like to question the leadership of the JSP as the central party in the opposition camp. At the same time, we would like to ask the Komeito and the DSP, which have increased the number of seats in the lower house to firmly establish themselves as a centrist force, to make their blueprints and courses concerning how they would reform the LDP government much clearer than they did in the past. The JCP, which doubled the number of seats, now has an even heavier duty to deal with the political situation today.

The prime responsibility for some voters accepting bribes rests with politicians trying to influence politics with money and power. All the candidates, whether successful or unsuccessful in the election, must acknowledge the power of the voters. We want the politicians to base their stances on this and start with cleansing elections and overthrowing timocracy and corrupt government.

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'YOMIURI' COMMENTS ON LDP DEFEAT IN ELECTION

Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 9 Oct 79  $_{\mbox{\footnotesize{p}}}$  2 OW

[Editorial: "Ohira's Bubble Bursts"]

[Text] The poor showing by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the 35th general election ended Prime Minister Ohira's dream of leading a strong, single-party administration into the 1980's. The Socialist Party (JSP) also did poorly and the New Liberal Club began withering away. But the Koméito and Communist Party (JCP) made recoveries.

It had been Ohira's plan to use a major victory in the election to secure his reelection as LDP president in next year's party election after a similar victory in the house of councilors election. However, this dream now is in shambles. Hereafter the LDP must obtain the cooperation of opposition parties to manage affairs in the lower house. It will need that cooperation particularly in handling such vital problems as rehabilitation of public finance, energy and resources, aid to developing countries and doing Japan's part to maintain world peace.

Public Finance Key Issue

The greatest issue now looming is public finance as shown by the tax increase becoming the major issue of the election campaign. The issuance of government bonds has now reached a staggering 59 trillion yen. Ohira was right in making public finance the major issue in the election but his leadership on this problem was questionable. He believes that it is impossible to trim expenditures and waste in government and this lost his party votes.

What he should have done also was to promise correction of tax inequalities and then propose an income tax increase as the last resort.

Another cause of the LDP's poor showing were the financial irregularities in public corporations and central government ministries and agencies which were exposed during the election battle. But exposed also was the collusion between labor and management in the bureaucracy by the JSP's ambiguous stand.

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Ohira's Objective

One reason for the dissolution of the Diet by Ohira was that opposition parties forced the government to abandon a bill to boost tobacco prices and bills related to the people's living through skillful manipulation of the aircraft sales scandal. Ohira sought to end this political sabotage by obtaining a comfortable majority but he failed.

But although his party slipped badly, Ohira's own faction gained seats, very possibly because he retained the key LDP posts for distribution of election funds within his faction. But this strategy backfired because of the disaster at the polls.

The decline of Ohira's leadership will cause convulsions within the LDP and create great difficulties in getting important legislation passed by the Diet. We hope the opposition will not gloat but show good sense and wisdom in parliamentary politics in the 1980's.

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JCP LEADER ON ASUKATA PROPOSAL TO UNITE FORCES

Tokyo JPS in English 0935 GMT 6 Oct 79 OW

[Text] Tokyo, 5 Oct, JPS--Kenji Miyamoto, presidium chairman of the Japanese Communist Party, on 5 October issued a statement expressing official views on Japan Socialist Party (JSP) Chairman Ichio Asukata's proposal for formation of a "greater people's union for elimination of jobbery and against mass taxes." A gist of the statement is given below:

The Asukata proposal raises the following three objectives: (1) to eliminate jobbery and establish clean government; (2) stop mass taxes and correct the present inequitable taxation system; and (3) carry out changes in administration into one which is equitable, democratic and effective.

These objectives are important part of the immediate policy objectives of the progressive forces. They are polits included also in the election policy put forward by the Communist Party, though not all of the pillars of the progressive objectives. They also represent what the people are keenly concerned with. It is therefore necessary for broad progressive forces to make efforts to unite themselves in action to achieve them. The JCP considers it quite logical to hold necessary consultations with other parties, including the JSP, in the next special session of the Diet to be convened after the election, taking into account that in the past this kind of consultation has often been held.

Asukata proposes "formation of a 'people's greater union for elimination of jobbery and against mass taxes, with a view to launching a great people's movement." This would be a good idea if it is really possible.

History shows, however, that this kind of JSP proposal used to abort after each election on the pretext of the rejection by such opposition parties as the Komei and Democratic Socialist parties which stand firmly for anti-communism. In this connection, we would like to ask if the JSP is ready to express its responsibility and resolution to implement its own proposal together with representatives of "the people of various

sections," disregarding any parties refusing to participate in the union. This is a very important question which needs to be answered clearly by the JCP.

1 (Miyamoto) suspected that the Asukata proposal would be a proposal aimed merely at the general election. This is unexpectedly proved correct very clearly. The problem now is this: As shown by the recent Asukata doctrine, the JSP is shelving its responsibility for the progressive local government being eliminated by the JSP itself in alliance with the LDP and going back on the efforts to form a progressive coalition or united front based on progressive objectives: It has gone so far as to create now obstacles to progressive unity by declaring to shelve a joint struggle by political parties and by insisting that the JSP must be entitled to play a pivotal role in progressive unity.

It is natural that we (Communist Party) cannot accept the Asukata proposal on the whole as a serious plan for a progressive unity.

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'AKAHATA' ON RECENT FINANCE SCANDAL, CORRUPTION

Tokyo JPS in English 0930 GMT 6 Oct 79 OW

[JCP issues interim report on railway corruption case]

[Text] Tokyo, 6 Oct, JPS--The 6 October issue of AKAHATA carried an editorial entitled "Judgment Should Be Handed Down on Corruption Prevalent Among Political, Financial and Bureaucrat Worlds," strongly appealing that "people's indignation against injustice and corruption prevalent among political, financial and bureaucrat worlds should be turned into an advance of the Japanese Communist Party."

The editorial points out that "suspicion over false accounting of the Railway Construction Corporation is quite deeply rooted in the Liberal Democratic Party's constitution on corruption and jobbery. This has all the more clearer than ever before, and said, "(Part of money saved from false accounting) has already been channeled to the LDP and the Democratic Socialist Party Diet members as political funds. The people can scarcely control their anger." [as received]

The editorial emphasized that "the issue is in no way a mere issue of false spending of public expense, but an indication of corrupt practice widely prevalent among political, financial and bureaucrat worlds. It is serious responsibility for the government and political parties to root out corruption," and continued, "thorough investigation into such unlawful and corrupt cases constitutes a precondition of sweeping of money power and corrupt politics, and turning of administration into democratic administration. It also constitutes a vital issue of the democratization of the administration. No excuse can be made to rejection of thorough investigation under the pretext of the general election. This rejection throws into relief something shady in politics by the government and the LDP.

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MEDIA TREATMENT OF LOWER HOUSE DISSOLUTION CRITICIZED

Tokyo CHUO KORON in Japanese Oct 79 p 164

[Text] By reporting that the political situation is directly headed toward a Lower House dissolution and general election, the various newspaper agencies are following the designs of Prime Minister Ohira and serving as a powerful media to encourage dissolution.

It is true that the 13 August 1979 issue of ASAHI newspaper did publish an editorial titled, "What Are the Purposes of Dissolution and General Election?" and objected to the arrogance of the Chira faction that "the LDP [Liberal Democratic Party] will win if an election is held," and the editorial in the 20 August 1979 issue of MAINICHI newspaper pointed out that dissolution talks, which did not clarify the reasons for dissolution, only deepened the disinterest of the people in politics.

However, these objections to the dissolution policy, which disregarded the people, hardly carried any punch, especially after the newspapers had competed among themselves to be the first to publish the anticipated roster of political candidates. They offered no resistance to Prime Minister Ohira whose expectations were fulfilled. In the final analysis, the great majority of the newspapers did not express clear-cut attitudes on the heart of the matter, that is, whether they opposed or approved the early fall dissolution. Under the circumstances, the mass media cannot evade the criticisms that they acted as drumbeaters for a "dissolution without justification."

Another item of concern is the appearance, here and there, in various newspapers of articles reporting on the return to power of the "shady boss," Kakuei Tanaka.

Commenting on the actions of former Prime Minister Tanaka, who appeared for the first time since the Lockheed incident at a formal meeting of his faction in late July, the YOMIURI newspaper in its 11 August 1979 issue wrote that, "the 'shady boss' who has appeared on the public stage is powerful," and that "leaders of the Tanaka faction are marveling at the 'revived bulldozer'." In its first article, dated 15 August 1979, of a series on "Elections of Pursued 'High Officials'," the ASAHI newspaper

reported on Tanaka who appeared in public "leading his troops," and commented that "as his intimates view the situation, Tanaka is unquestionably weathering the Lockheed incident," and the present Kakuei Tanaka is "progressing steadily toward restoration of his authority."

The ASAHI newspaper, in its planned series of articles covering the vote-gathering activities of "high officials," who were in the limelight at one time because of political suspicions raised by the Lockheed and Nissho Iwai incidents involving aircraft imports, probably intended to impress upon the voters that the practice of using monetary influence was deep-rooted within the LDP. Do the news reporters realize, however, that by reporting a detail, and with glaring photos, the election campaigns of the "high officials," they are, in effect, assisting in their election campaigns?

To point out the third problem area in election-related reporting, the mass media are generally exaggerating the mood of LDP recovery and Conservatives' comeback and repeating the prediction of the LDP head-quarters that the focal point of the next election is whether the LDP can win the stable majority of over 271 seats.

Actually, however, is the situation so one-sidedly favorable for the LDP? There are many unknown factors which require further analysis, such as the trend toward inflationary prices caused by the arrival of the \$20-crude oil age, opposition to the Ohira regime for movement toward increased taxes and influence of the cooperative efforts in electioneering of the four middle-road parties.

The criticisms of the opposition parties, that to repeat reporting that the LDP will gain a safe majority is favoring the LDP, must also be heeded.

The mass media are confronted with the need for "objective reporting" and "non-partisanship," which evades the crucial point of approving or opposing a stable majority of the LDP.

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'AKAHATA' COMMENTS ON JAPAN'S PARTIES, BOAT PEOPLE

Tokyo JPS in English 0855 GMT 5 Oct 79 OW

[Text] Tokyo, Oct 5, JPS--What attitude is to be taken on the so-called boat people? This question amounts to an important touchstone to determine the value of all parties foreign policies and political attitudes.

The Liberal-Democratic, the Komei and the Democratic Socialist parties claim that the Vietnamese Government is taking a "desertion" and "oppression" policy on the Vietnamese people, utilizing the "refugee" problem as a material to discredit socialism, and to attack the Japanese Communist Party. AKAHATA on October 5 carries an editorial entitled "The Way To Solve the Refugee Problem." The following is an excerpt from the editorial:

"The important point is that they (refugees) never say that they were oppressed by the government, although they may grumble about the disability to carry on their living as they had enjoyed under the previous regime. They were not thrown out of their fatherland, but they left or [are] leaving their country.

"Presently, the Vietnamese Government strictly controls illegal immigrants, but grants freedom of departure to those wishing to emigrate, on the condition that they are accepted by the destination countries. Do the Japanese political forces, which slander the Vietnamese emigration policy as the desertion policy or the oppression policy, consider demanding that the Vietnamese Government should suppress freedom of emigration, in violation of the stipulations in the United Nations Charter and the international declaration of human rights?

"As Japan was the direct aggressor country against the three countries in Indochina during World War II, and was the active country taking share in the U.S. war of aggression against Vietnam, the LDP government must assume dual responsibilities for causing the present refugee problem. Furthermore, the LDP government, which virtually gave support to China's war of aggression against Vietnam, must assume triple responsibilities. At

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the same time, the DSP and Komei cannot escape from assuming responsibilities for giving direct and indirect support for the aggressive U.S. policy, and not protecting China's act of aggression.

"As they are the parties which are jointly responsible more or less, for causing the refugees, they are incapable of producing any program to solve the refugee problem."

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'AKAHATA' EDITORIAL CONDEMNS SONODA'S KAMPUCHEAN PROPOSAL

Tokyo JPS in English 0854 GMT 29 Sep 79 OW

[Text] Tokyo, 29 Sep, JPS--Japanese Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda's proposal on an "Aid to Cambodia," which was put forward in his speech in the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September, "has revealed the intention to intervene in the internal affairs of Cambodia, under the cloak of peace and humanitarianism," said an AKAHATA editorial on 29 September.

The Sonoda proposal "neglects the reality that the present Cambodian administration is exerting an effective control over the whole of the country, thus trampling on the national sovereignty of Cambodia." The editorial continued: "In the period of the past 8-plus months since the establishment, the present regime has restored freedom and democracy for the people, and is now tackling the task of stabilizing the people's living and the economy. On the other side, the Pol Pot clique which was ousted from the government by the uprising Cambodian people, is making sabotage activities in some places by holding people in hostage, obtaining various kinds of aid from the Chinese leadership. This is the cause that hinders Cambodia from restoring long-lasting peace."

Refuting Sonda's argument that the aid and cooperation in various fields which Vietnam has been extending to Cambodia for its reconstruction on the official request from the present Cambodian Government "constitutes an intervention from an external force," the AKAHATA editorial said that this argument "amounts to the denial of friendly relations between these countries based on the request of each other's independence and sovereignty."

Denouncing the Japanese foreign minister's proposal for "an international conference by the countries concerned," the editorial said: "If this permits an interference and intervention by foreign countries, it will only impose further hardship on the self-reliant settlement of the internal affairs of Cambodia and aggravate the agony of the Cambodian people."

The fact that relief materials from the UNICEF and the International Red Cross have surely been handed to the Cambodian people "has proved that

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humanitarian aid is carried out effectively only through the present government exerting an effective control over the country," the paper asserted. Calling attention to the point included in the Sonoda proposal that "a concrete system be set up to guarantee safe and smooth execution of the international steps for relief." The editorial said: "If this means setting up a 'non-military zone' on the excuse of distributing relief materials, as reported by some press, it inevitably leads to creating a stage for intervention in the internal affairs of Cambodia, neglecting her sovereignty, and restricting and dissolving the effective control now being exerted by the present regime."

The editorial said: "The Japanese Communist Party sternly warns the liberal Democratic Party Government which supports the Pol Pot clique which has caused the unprecedented hardship on Cambodia, and in the meanwhile, is making effort to open a way to an international intervention in Cambodia under the guise of neutrality and humanitarianism. The JCP once more demands that the Japanese Government must extend an emergency relief to the Cambodian people through the present regime which has established the effective control over that country," the AKAHATA editorial concluded.

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'SANKEI' BLAMES DIPLOMACY FOR SOVIET SHIKOTAN BASE

Tokyo SANKEI SHIMBUN in Japanese 27 Sep 79 Morning Edition p 1 OW

[Article by Akihiko Ushiba: "Shikotan Base Is a Product of Japan's Weak-kneed Diplomacy"]

[Text] The Soviet forces' advance to Shikotan Island had long been anticipated by military strategists. The massive reinforcement of the Soviet forces in the Far East—as seen in the redeployment of ground troops on Kunashiri and Etorofu, Japan's inherent territories, and the deployment of the aircraft carrier Minsk to the Far East—boils down to an exercise of military pressure on Japan in retaliation for the conclusion of the Japan—China Peace and Friendship Treaty. Realizing this, one could naturally have anticipated that some kind of a military action would be forthcoming on that island sooner or later.

In this sense, the latest development makes us perceive how narrowsighted and "illogical" the government was in explaining that the construction of military bases on Kunashiri and Etorofu was "defensive in nature."

Militarily speaking, the fact that the Soviet forces have come as far as Shikotan Island, which is part of Hokkaido, is extremely serious. During World War II, Japan deployed a brigade on the island. As one can see from this fact, Shikotan is vital to Japan's security in both offensive and defensive stragegy. The presence of a military force on that island directly affects Nemro City in the eastern part of Hokkaido, and the construction of a military base on that strategically important island located at the mouth of the Kunashiri Waterway gives freedom of action to the Soviet submarine fleet based at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula. It means that Japan's sea route to the Atlantic Ocean will be more seriously jeopardized.

What should not go unheeded is the fact that, in case of an emergency, the Soviet Union will have a much wider choice of military actions. On the other hand, Japan will have to think of maintaining a defense setup in that area in addition to one in the Kunashiri area. Since until now an invasion through the Neumro Peninsula has been said to be unlikely, Japan's defense plan now certainly needs to be overhauled. Needless to say, Japan

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must take appropriate countermeasures to cope with the situation but we should also remember that Japan is also responsible by helping to create the situation.

When the Soviet Union built military bases on Kunashiri and Etorofu islands, Japan merely lodged perfunctory protests and did not take any effective action.

Had Japan taken a firmer action at the time, the Soviet Union would not have dared to build a military base on Shikotan. Of course, we cannot say with absolute certainty that the Soviet Union would not have built a military base there but at least we can say that it would have somewhat restrained the Soviet Union in view of its habit—in the words of former Defense Council secretary general Unabara—of "getting tough when the opponent gets soft and getting soft when the opponent becomes tough." Of course, there should have been many ways of showing a firm attitude, not only in the area of defense but also in the political, diplomatic and economic areas. By not doing so, Japan feigned ignorance about this "little violence" thus allowing another, bigger unlawful act to happen.

Some people who denounced Japan's defense white paper for this year as "inciting a sense of crisi for no purpose" talked as if they knew everything by saying that "to talk about the Soviet military buildup is to play into the hands of the Soviets."

However, the ensuing events seem to have proven that their remarks were just what the Soviets wanted to hear.

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JCP OFFICIAL RAPS LDP HANDLING OF SOVIET BASE ISSUE

Tokyo JPS in English 0858 GMT 3 Oct 79 OW

[Text] Tokyo, 3 Oct, JPS--Hiroshi Tachiki, chief of the international affairs department of the Japanese Communist Party, on October 2 issued a statement on the Defense Agency's report "Recent Moves of the Soviet Military Forces on the Northern Islands." The following is a detailed introduction of his statement:

--The Ohira government had earlier unfolded a political campaign based on the U.S. Government's information that "Soviet military bases are being built on Shikotan Island," and gave impetus to a political campaign of this kind by making the Defense Agency issue a report on October 2 on the "Strengthening of the Soviet Military Buildup on Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands." The purpose of this campaign is that the Ohira cabinet and the Liberal Democratic Party are attempting to divert voters' attention from issues, such as tax increase, including the introduction of the general consumer tax, the scandal of the Railway Construction Corporation and other issues, because the Ohira cabinet and the LDP have been driven into a corner by these issues.

In no way can we tolerate Japan-U.S. joint operation of information aimed at diverting the points at issue of the general election at the last stage of the election.

--What we must point out is that such an exaggerated political campaign is closely linked to maneuvers aimed at the buildup of the Japan-U.S. joint military operation based on the "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation," dangerous reinforcement of the self-defense forces, and rapid military integration between Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea. In this connection, what cannot be thought little of is that the U.S. military forces on September 30 began deploying the upto-date sophisticated F-15 Eagles on Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, in the course of this political campaign initiated by the U.S. administration.

--Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island, part of Hokkaido, should be returned to Japan together with Chishima Islands which are historically Japanese territory.

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For the sake of this purpose, as was repeatedly asserted by the JCP, the Japanese Government should call for an early return of Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island, and on the Chishima Islands the Japanese Government should abrogate the pertinent paragraph of Clause C, Article 2 of the San Franciso Treaty, which stipulates the renouncement of the right, title, and right of claim. By so doing, the way of return can be opened, to reach this goal. It is necessary to oppose more than anything else the dangerous LDP government's maneuvers aimed at strengthening the Japan-U.S. joint military buildup under the pretext of "threat from the north" and establish an independent diplomacy serving Asian peace and the genuine independence and security of Japan.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

## AUXILIARY ORGAN PRESIDENT DRAWS HUGE RETIREMENT

Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 21 Sep 79 p 3

[Text] The former president of an auxiliary organization of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government assumed the chairmanship of the same body in April this year after retiring from the presidency in July last year with retirement pay amounting to a whopping \$680 million.

This was disclosed to the ASAHI SHIMBUN on Thursday by anonymous people who are angered by the free spending of public funds.

The public retirement pay received by the ex-president of the satellite organ might be the highest ever. Even after about 40 percent in taxes is deducted, it comes close to \$400 million.

This is more than 10 times the retirement allowance granted the chief of a Metropolitan Government department or bureau.

The lucky man is Takeshi Tanaka, 79, who lives in Kichijoji in Tokyo's Musashino City. He had been president of the Tokyo Credit Assurance Association, an extra-departmental body of the Metropolitan Government for 32 years.

Then an ordinary employee of the Tokyo city government, Tanaka was dispatched to the association when it was founded in 1937. He climbed the ladder fast.

He was president of the association from June, 1946, to the end of June, 1978. He became an adviser soon after retiring from the presidency and was then appointed chairman when this post was created by partially revising the articles of incorporation this April.

Tanaka's retirement pay was calculated in accordance with the retirement rules for ordinary employees.

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It consisted of an amount for the eight years and 11 months prior to his assuming the presidency, an amount for his 32 years as president and an amount given in recognition of his meritorious deeds.

HIs salary at the time of his retirement, the basis for computing the retirement allowance, was \$1,556,000. Seventy-five percent of this sum was multiplied by the number of months he was in office, resulting in about \$450 million. This amount was then increased by 50 percent.

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MILITARY

EXPERT CASTS DOUBT ON EFFECTIVE CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER JSDA

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Jul 79 pp 94-135

[Article by Prof Michio Morishima of London University: "Heated Debate: War and Peace--Question of 'New Armament Plan'"]

[Excerpt] I also think that if we are to have armed forces they should be under civilian control. At the same time, however, I feel that civilian control in Japan is an extremely difficult proposition. Consequently, those who advocate civilian control, and feel that the armed forces will be safe under such control, must adequately take into account the possibility that if they go ahead and increase military strength because of this belief, they may unexpectedly lose control and may end up under military control as it was in the past, with the armed forces running rampant.

Civilian control is difficult to achieve in Japan for the following reasons. First, military persons are the specialists in military affairs, and since the civilians and politicians are non-specialists, if civilian control is brought about, the specialists will end up having to obey the non-specialists. The principle of supremacy of non-specialists constitutes the background of such an ideology of civilian control, and it is the Anglo-Saxon countries, England in particular, where civilian control is carried out in an ideal form, following the ideology of the supremacy of non-specialists. In England it is not only the military, but other specialists as well who are under the thumbs of the non-specialists, so that civilian control does not at all appear unusual there.

For instance, England is ruled by the party in power, but its secret of success is that the Cabinet (non-specialists in administration) carries on the administration by controlling the bureaucracy (specialists). In the jury system, the jury (a committee of 12 citizens—non-specialists arbitrarily selected from a district) ascertains the facts, while the judge (a specialist) merely applies the law and determines the measure of punishment. The laws themselves are not established by the judges (specialists) but by representatives in Parliament (non-specialists).

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Thus in England the supremacy of the non-specialist (democracy) is seen in the executive, legislative and judicial aspects of government, while in Japan it is only the legislative aspect that is so.

While it is said that Japan is governed by political parties, the main forces of the LDP are former bureaucrats, and within the party, the partisans (the non-specialists in administration) are dominated by the bureaucrats (the specialists). That is, the Cabinet does not rule the bureaucracy; rather on the contrary, the bureaucracy has repressed the political party, and such a superior posture of the specialists has been a tradition in Japan since the time of Hirobumi Ito. Furthermore, the Japanese judiciary is completely specialized and a jury system never did get established.

A further example of Japan as a nation that opposes the non-specialist principle is seen in the Japanese style of self-government in the universities. The procedures for university self-government differ from country to country. In Japan it is the faculty council that is responsible, with separate self-government by the faculty council of each department. As a typical example, in the old style Imperial university system, in those universities, personnel matters for professors in a department of economics, for example, are decided by the faculty council of the department of economics; professors from other departments have no say whatsoever. The university president, while bearing such a title, merely transmits documents to the Ministry of Education. Since he cannot attend faculty selection committees, this is a perfect example of rule by specialist.

In English universities how are personnel matters relating to instructional staff carried out? Since the practices vary with each university, no definite single system exists, but the system described below with little objection can probably be called the British system. If a department of economics decides to hire an instructional staff member, the candidacy is publicized. The list of candidates is made known to the department, the department makes a preliminary check on them through their files, weeds out those it is not interested in hiring and establishes a shorter list (the "short list"). The selection committee is made up of representatives from the department concerned (the department of economics), related departments (statistics, sociology, etc.) and unrelated departments (chemistry, physics, etc.), and the candidates remaining on the short list are interviewed by the committee.

Surprise upsets occasionally occur since persons who are ranked very high by the economics department do not necessarily show the best results in the interview. This is because there are not a few cases in which a committee member who is not well grounded in economics may ask an unexpected question so that the candidate, who is a specialist in his field, is taken by surprise, makes a wrong move, and loses out. Since the committee is deliberately organized so that members from the economics department do not constitute a majority, specialists cannot form an alliance to oust a non-specialist. If they make the department-level screening very strict

and narrow the number of candidates down to two or three, it may happen that everyone fails the interview and no one passes, so making the short list extremely small is not a good strategy. If we assume one person is selected from a rather long short list it is quite possible that a person will be chosen who ranked high in the department's evaluation. In any case, since a committee in which non-specialists constitute over half of the members does the selection, we must say that compared to Japanese universities, English universities are much more oriented towards control by non-specialists.

Thus in England, the government, the courts, Parliament, and the universities are all non-specialist oriented, and the military forces are also so oriented. In Japan, on the contrary, almost all fields are dominated by specialists. Under such conditions, we must admit that it would be very difficult to place only the military under civilian control. A military man would say "leave breadmaking to the bakers." He might also add "why is it only us that you do not trust?" And who can deny that the SDF in uniform will use, as a slogan, the words "at least give us the same amount of self-governing authority as the university professors have."

The British esteem the non-specialist principle because they try to respect common sense and at the same time reflect the voice of the common people in decisions of the social will. But under such a system the efficiency of the economy and of military preparedness is poor, and economic growth becomes sluggish. (In "England and Japan" and its "continuation" I explained the contradiction between the two party system and the economic growth rate in terms of the concept of "the cost outlay of democracy.")

On the other hand, the Japanese advocate control by specialists because they esteem efficiency. It is precisely because of this efficiency principle that Japan has achieved modernization so rapidly. As long as the Japanese have confidence in the modernization they have achieved, it is impossible to abandon the specialist principle, and it is fundamentally impossible for this principle to exist alongside civilian control of the military.

Allow me to explain a second reason why civilian control is difficult in Japan. Under civilian control, as far as major issues go, since the military would have to follow the decisions of civilians, the armed forces would be unable to move quickly, and would lag behind especially in the opening stages of war. The Kanto Army was strong because not only was it not under civilian control, it did not even obey central military authority and was completely wrapped up in its own self-centeredness. To put the military under civilian control is just like forcing them to be like champion sumo wrestlers—unless they are very strong forces, they will be unable to conduct war objectively, i.e. if forced out of the ring, they won't be able to take a gulp of air and return for a counterattack. In the case of limited military preparations, in order to mobilize the military on a large scale, the civilian population must accede to military requirements and even if civilian control is implemented it can be in appearance only.

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It is only powerful military forces that have been placed under civilian control, but under Japan's present political and economic status, such large military preparations are impossible, and neither Seki nor Inoki are advocating them. In order for compact military forces trimmed of all waste, or for the "minimum self defense capability" advocated by Seki to become an effective defense force, it is necessary to permit the military to act in its own judgment to meet whatever situation develops.

Thirdly, the circumstance that a civilian population capable of controlling the military has not been cultivated in Japan would probably make civilian control difficult. Of course it was true in the old military academies, and at the Self Defense Forces Academy as well, that many hours are spent on cultivating decision-making ability. However, in ordinary Japanese universities knowledge is merely being absorbed, and whether the students are being cultivated in high ideals or in decision making, they are not learning leadership. I must say, it is extremely doubtful whether the Japanese have been educated sufficiently to be able to have civilian control over the military. Without reforming higher education in Japan and allowing the situation to continue in which the military receive a better education, if the military forces are strengthened, rather than achieving civilian control, Japan may indeed end up being dominated by the military. Unfortunately, Japan still must create a foundation in society for civilian control before it introduces such control over the military. An easily achieved control is bound to end in disaster.

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ECONOMIC

'YOMIURI' RAPS SOVIET STANCE

Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 29 Sep 79 p 2 OW

[Editorial: "Japan-Soviet Cooperation"]

[Text] The eighth joint conference of the Japan-Soviet and Soviet-Japan business cooperation committees ended Thursday in Moscow with a small step forward taken in the joint development of Siberia and the Soviet Far East. However, a major advance in the scope and speed-up of the project, hoped for by the Soviet Union, will not be realized unless bilateral political relations are improved.

Premier Aleksey Kosygin reportedly expressed impatience over the slow progress of the bilateral project, saying that the Japanese Government kept talking about cooperation but did nothing in substance. We disagree with this interpretation of the status quo between the two countries. Indeed, the Siberian and Soviet Far East development projects are far behind the schedule envisaged by Moscow, but the cause for the delay lies mainly with the Soviet Union.

#### A Better Understanding

These causes include an acute lack of transportation facilities, poor fund allocation and an unrealistic method of paying back loans with products.

The latest conference appears to have given the Soviet Union a more realistic understanding of the problems. While this was a step forward, it hardly brightens the prospects for Japan-Soviet cooperation.

In reality, the Soviet Union said in the joint communique that it was necessary to conclude a long-term economic cooperation agreement and for Japan to provide the USSR with global credits in order to promote bilateral economic cooperation.

Japanese Help Necessary

The realization of the three projects--an integrated steel mill, a copper smelting plant in Udokan and asbestos development in Molodezhnava--may

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possibly be expedited by an economic cooperation agreement or a loan. However, any such commitment would require the wholehearted support of the Japanese people. Economic cooperation cannot be kept apart from political relations.

We would like to point out that large-scale development of Siberia and the Soviet Far East will be difficult without full Japanese cooperation in supplying funds and technology. For more than 10 years, Moscow has continued to declare that it will go it alone in developing its Siberian-Far East resources if Japan is unwilling to cooperate.

This may apply to a smaller-scale project, but not to such a major project as building an integrated steel mill with an annual production capacity of 12 million tons of crude steel. Joint development of Siberia and the Soviet Far East will strengthen Soviet-Japan relations. To this end, we must stress the political prerequisites for mutual cooperation.

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ECONOMIC

TOKYO POWER COMPANY BUYS PACIFIC NATURAL GAS FIELD

Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 6 Oct 79 p 1 OW

[Excerpt] A natural gas field in the Pacific Ocean has suddenly taken on increased importance as an energy source for Japan because the Tokyo Electric Power Company has decided to purchase the gas field's entire output, informed sources disclosed Friday.

The Joban-oki natural gas field, 40 kilometers of Joban, Fukushima-ken, was discovered in November 1973 during joint prospecting efforts by Teikoku Oil Company, Higashi Nippon Oil Development Company and Esso Abukuma Incorporated, a wholly owned subsidiary of Exxon Corporation.

Deposits of 10 billion cubic meters (7,200,000 tons in terms of liquefied natural gas) have been confirmed while between 3.5 billion and 5.5 billion cubic meters (2,500,000 to 3,900,000 tons) are believed to be recoverable. This is on a scale similar to that of the offshore oil field in the Sea of Japan off Aga, Niigata-ken, Japan's only offshore natural gas field being developed for commercial purposes.

Up to now, no company offered to develop the Josan-oki field because of the prohibitive cost involved since it is  $40\ \text{kilometers}$  off the coast and lies at a depth of  $150\ \text{meters}$ .

However, the sharp rise in the crude oil prices since last December and the accompanying rise in the price of imported natural gas have rendered the development of the Joban-oki field commercially feasible.

In deciding to purchase the field's entire output, the Tokyo Electric Power Company reached agreement with three developers. Both sides agreed to conclude a 10-year contract on the supply of natural gas from the field. Commercial extraction is scheduled to start in 1984.

The Tokyo Electric Power Company believes that the price of imported natural gas will rise to the same level as the price of natural gas from the field off Joban around 1984.

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**ECONOMIC** 

#### BRIEFS

TOYOTA PLANT INVESTMENT--Toyota Motor, in preparation for the forthcoming "Japan-U.S. small car war," is aiming at a yearly production capacity of 3.5 million vehicles and mass production of new small car models. To this end, construction of a new 30 billion yen plant in Aichi Prefecture will start in October with completion scheduled for spring 1981 and plans call for two more production lines by 1985. Total investment for all three new production lines is estimated at 100 billion yen, and the three lines will have a combined capacity of 30,000 vehicles monthly. [Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 19 Sep 79 p 1]

MITSUBISHI MOTORS PLANTS--Mitsubishi Motors is beefing up and consolidating production lines and adding an engine plant with the intent of increasing production capacity to 1.2 million vehicles a year by spring 1980. [Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 27 Sep 79 p 11]

FUJI PHOTO FILM--Chairman Hirata of Fuji Photo Film was interviewed on the present difficult situation in the Japanese photo materials industry. Chairman Hirata considers technological power and product quality the key to future success in the film industry. Lowering of tariffs mandated by the Tokyo Round is expected to be handled on a "case by case" fashion in intergovernmental negotiations and will present less of a problem to his company than changes in the exchange rate. While the sky-rocketing price of silver should be handled mainly by passing on the cost via price increases, stabilizing the silver market is much more important and raising prices alone will not solve the problem so long as the silver market remains disorderly. Fuji Photo Film is engaged in R&D on instant cameras, but due to U.S. price competition present policy is to watch how matters develop while conducting a meticulous market survey. [Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 18 Sep 79 p 10]

LNG FROM AUSTRALIA—An eight-member Japanese utilities group will import 6.5 million tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) a year from Australia over 20 years starting in 1985 under an agreement to be signed shortly. The group, composed of five electric power and three gas companies, has reached board agreement with western Australia's Woodside Petroleum Limited, informed sources said Friday. The group hopes to exchange letters of intent with the Australian company before the end of this year. This would be the first Japanese import of LNG from Australia. [Text] [Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 6 Oct 79 p 1 OW]

STEEL PLANT FOR GDR--Nissho-iwai Company has contracted with the GDR Plant Import Corporation (IAI) to export a 7-billion yen cast steel plant to be built by Komatsu Company. The plant, scheduled to be put into operation in Leipzig in late 1983, will have an annual capacity of 15,400 tons of mining machinery parts. Shipment of the plant will begin in 1981, and payment will be made in yen on an 8-year deferred payment basis. [Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 19 Sep 79 Morning Edition p 8 OW]

YEN CREDIT TO PRC--Beijing, 8 Oct--Shinichi Yanai, director of the Foreign Ministry's Economic Cooperation Bureau and head of a government delegation visiting China, told a press conference in Beijing today that the total amount of loans China wants Japan to provide it might be drastically reduced and readjusted because the total includes some domestic funds to be generated by China. The delegation has been in China since last January for a preliminary survey in connection with China's request for Japan's yen credit. Yanai also said that China had officially requested Japan to help in the construction of a 1,000-bed general hospital. China wants Japan to extend \$5.5 billion in government assistance to it. However, it has become clear that the total amount includes domestic funds which China has to raise by itself. Thus, China will now clarify the amount of assistance it wants from Japan. Yanai said that Japan would begin studying data on four projects (two related to railway construction and the other two related to port construction) which his delegation has obtained from Chinese authorities. [Text] [Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 9 Oct 79 Morning Edition p 1 OW]

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#### SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

MITI TO SUBSIDIZE, LEASE SOLAR HEATERS

Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 20 Sep 79 p 3

[Text] The Ministry of International Trade and Industry plans to spread the use of solar energy in home to some 12 million homes, 29 percent of the nation's households by 1995.

MITI has drawn up a plan to install solar systems in 30,000 individual homes on a lease basis in the next fiscal year, the first year in the ministry's program to promote solar energy in an effort to curtail dependency on imported oil.

At present sun-powered systems capable of supplying hot water or for heating and cooling rooms is only used in about 3,000 households, including the houses which were built to test solar systems.

The bottleneck in the propagation of solar system in Japan is the high cost of installing the system due to the low production rate. At present there are only about 10 manufacturers producing solar systems.

For instance, the installation cost for a solar heater at a house with 3LDK-type layout (three bedrooms, a living room and a dining-kitchen)or larger 4LDK-type house costs \\$500,000 for a system which can supply only hot water.

The cost for the system for supplying hot water and for room heating goes up to from \$800,000 to \$1,000,000. The system for supplying hot water plus heating and cooling would run as high as from \$2,000,000 to \$2,500,000.

To cut the cost, MITI has decided to lease solar systems to households for the time being until the production costs go down so that they are suitable for home owners.

MITI will subsidize the manufacturers and the agents dealing in the product for one-half of the price of a standard model of solar system.

Then the makers and the agents will rent solar heaters to individual households for a period of from five to eight years. The suppliers will also be required to guarantee the quality of their products and extend maintenance service after installation.

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

METAL HYDRIDE HEATING, COOLING SYSTEM UNDER DEVELOPMENT

Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 25 Sep 79 p 3

#### [Text]

A step is being taken toward practical application of a heating-air-conditioning system utilizing chemical reactions between metals and hydrogen as a result of the Research Development Corporation of Japan giving Sekisui Chemical Co. about ¥200 million to develop the system.

lion to develop the system.

This system, based on the idea of Seijiro Suda, assistant professor at Kogakuin University, can obtain high temperatures from low-temperature heat sources and generate power from boiling water.

Suda believed that the metal hydrides, which are considered safe methods for transporting and storing hydrogen, can be utilized in heating and air-conditioning systems. He proved the fact with a small-scale experimental model.

when alloys made of titanium, manganese and cobalt react to hydrogen, they emit heat and create metal hydrides. Conversely, when they disintegrate into metals and hydrogen, they absorb heat. Suda's idea is to bounce hydrogen back and forth between two types of metal hydrides, heating with the heatemission reaction and air-con-

ditioning with the heat-absorbing reaction.

The system consists of a pair of cylinders, a radiator to release heat outside the house, a solar heat collector and a ventilator. Cylinder A contains one type of metal hydride (powder) and hydrogen, while cylinder B contains a different type of metal hydride (powder).

When hot water heated by solar energy passes through cylinder A, disintegration reaction occurs within the cylinder with the hydrogen moving over to cylinder B. The hydrogen combines with the metal in cylinder B to produce hot air, which is sent into the room.

This reaction stops after advancing to a certain point, so a switch is made to another pair of cylinders to create the same reactions. During this time, cylinder B is heated with water. The metal hydride in cylinder B will be disintegrated, and the hydrogen will return to cylinder A. The heat created by the hydrogen combining with the metal in cylinder A is released outdoors by the radiator.

If three pairs of cylinders are lined up and are made to react one after the other, it will be possible in winter to "amplify" the 30.40 degrees C heat collected from the sun to 60-70 degrees C.

In the case of air-conditioning, exactly the opposite reactions to heating will be utilized to take heat out of the room.

The Research Development Carporation of Japan, believing the system is much more efficient in heating and airconditioning than current solar heaters, hopes to be using the system in homes in about three years. Its plan calls for placing three pairs of cylinders—each cylinder 13 centimeters in diameter and one meter long and with a capacity of 10 liters—outside a room 25 square meters in size. Since reactions in each pair will only continue for 10 minutes, time switches will be attached to continuously switch among the three pairs for continuous operation.

The cost of the system will be from 1.5 to 2 times (about \( \frac{1}{3} \) million) that of a sunpowered heater, but maintenance costs will be one-third or one-fourth.

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